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The Two-Way Mirror: International
Arbitration as Comparative
Procedure
Andreas F. Lowenfeld*
Arbitration of international commercial disputes means different things to
different observers or participants. Some view it as a speedy and inexpensive
alternative to lengthy litigation.' Others view arbitration as a way to deflect
intense antagonism, something like mediation or counseling, where the sharp
edges of law and fact are smoothed over in a resolution that all concerned can
accept. 2 Still others view arbitration just like litigation, except that the jurisdictional obstacles have been avoided. 3 My own perception-having sat in my
professor's (i.e., observer's) chair even as I was a participant in numerous international arbitrations-is different from each of these perceptions. I see international arbitration-especially the typical arbitration with two party-appointed
arbitrators from different states and a chairman from a third state-on the one
hand as an exercise in comparative procedure, and on the other hand as source
and evidence of a norm of international conduct which may be different from
(though similar to) the law of any given nation-state.
Most serious writing about arbitration follows the "law review format," which
I take it means never say anything without a source, produce a great many
footnotes, and cite a maximum of reported appellate decisions. It is certainly

* Charles L. Denison Professor of Law, New York University School of Law; A.B. 1951, Harvard
University; LL.B. 1955, Harvard Law School. Professor Lowenfeld is a former deputy legal advisor
to the United Staes Department of State and an associate reporter for the Restatement of Foreign
Relations Law (revised).-eds.
1. See, e.g., Domke, InternationalArbitration of Commercial Disputes, in 2
THE INsTITUTE ON PRIVATE INVESTMENT ABROAD

PROCEEDINGS OF

131 (R. Wilson ed. 1960).

2. See Carbonneau, The Elaboration of a French Court Doctrine on InternationalCommercial
Arbitration: A Study in Civilian Judicial Creativity, 55 TULANE L. REV. 1, 2 (1980); David, David on
Arbitration in the International Trade, in THE ART OF ARBITRATION 89, 91-92 (J. Schultsz & A. van
den Berg eds. 1982).
3. E.g., Goff, Presenting Evidence Under English Law, 41 ARBITRATION 54, 55 (1974).
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possible to do this in writing about arbitration, 4 but I believe only at considerable
cost. Discussing arbitration through cases in the law reports has the same failing,
I submit, as most of American administrative law, which does not reveal much
about how administrative agencies function but tells a great deal about judicial
control of administrative action-a quite different subject. 5 Similarly, one may
write in law review format about actions to compel or enjoin arbitration, to stay
litigation pending arbitration, and to confirm, enforce, or set aside arbitral
awards. All of these topics are interesting and important; none, however, tells
very much about arbitration itself. This article undertakes to explore the process
of international arbitration-the main event, as it were-rather than what comes
before or after, which may well take place in court but if all goes well should not
take place at all.
Writing about the main event has certain drawbacks. Arbitration is-almost by
definition-nearly always confidential, and even when awards are published,
they tend to be redacted in such a way that the process and method on which I
want here to concentrate are very difficult to discern. 6 The secondary literature
tends to be of the "how to do it" character-useful tips on drafting clauses,
choosing a forum, or presenting cases 7-but not reflective. Thus one is left
largely to his own resources-in my case about a decade of experience, primarily
as arbitrator, occasionally as adviser. This article is not "social science," in the
sense of being founded on a statistical sample; nor is it "law review format," in
the sense of permitting "cite & substance" control. It is, however, an attempt to
subject international arbitration to academic inquiry, by which, needless to say, I
do not mean what journalists mean by that term. I want to try to put on paper
some of what I have learned as arbitrator, not just about arbitration, but about law
overall.
In particular, by focusing on selected aspects of the international procedure of
international arbitration, as well as on different approaches to the problem of
choosing the source of the law to be applied, I hope to give the outsider some
feeling for the process, and some perception of how international arbitration is
different both from domestic arbitration and from litigation in national courts. I
have an additional purpose, as well, however, though I want to be sure not to
4. See, e.g., M. DOMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION §§ 24:00-24:02 (Wilner rev. ed. 1984);
DROIT INTERNATIONALE PRIVE 132-71 (5th ed. 1983); A. VAN DEN BERG,
THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 1958 (1981); Hunter, Arbitration Procedure in

J. ROBERT, LARBITRAGE:

England: Past, Present and Future, I ARB. INT'L 82 (1985).
5. See, e.g., K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE (2d ed. 1978); L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL
CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION (1965); B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2d ed. 1984).
6. See, e.g., J. LEW, APPLICABLE LAW IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1978).
7. See, e.g., Aksen, Drafting Arbitration Clauses in International Agreements, in ARBITRATION
AND THE LICENSING PROCESS 3 (R. Goldscheider & M. de Haas eds. 1984); Branson & Tupman,
Selecting an Arbitral Forum: A Guide to Cost-Effective International Arbitration, 24 VA. 1. INT'L L.
917 (1984).
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sound too pretentious about it. I hope that focusing on the record, on discovery,
on examination of witnesses, and on choosing a choice of law will shed some
light on the various legal systems from which the techniques of international
arbitration have been drawn, and will raise for each reader some questions about
the inevitability of the system to which he or she is accustomed.
Of course, both in the European and in the Anglo-American system, arbitration is somewhat different from ordinary civil litigation, but it is clear that the
litigation model is the point of departure to which all comparisons and analogies
(conscious and unconscious) refer. If domestic arbitration is a derivative of domestic litigation, one might suppose that arbitration involving participants from
different states would be a synthesis of the derivatives. In substantial measure, I
think that is true, and is reflected in the experience on which this paper is based.
International arbitration is thus a two-way mirror: the participants in a legal
system see themselves as others see them, and they get an idea of how others
approach tasks similar to their own.
A bit of definition may be in order. By international arbitration, I mean what
the U.S. Supreme Court had in mind in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 8 and a decade earlier in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. 9
Parties from different states make a contract (or a series of related contracts); the
contract provides that all (or specified) disputes that may arise under the contract
shall, if not settled by negotiation, be submitted to an arbitrator or panel of
arbitrators; and usually the contract goes on to say how the arbitrators are to be
chosen, where the arbitration is to take place, and whether particular rules of
procedure are to be applied, such as those of the International Chamber of
Commerce, the Grain and Feed Trade Association, the American Arbitration
Association, or the London Court of Arbitration.' 0 Sometimes, the agreement to
arbitrate is more elaborate, with choice of law clauses, language clauses, enforcement provisions and waivers of various kinds. It is also possible, though in
my experience not as common as one might think, for an agreement to arbitrate
to be concluded after a dispute arises, i.e., not as part of the contract. Another
variation may be that the panel is constituted before a particular dispute arises,
for example by a trade association. But the basic pattern is constitution of an
arbitral panel after a dispute arises, pursuant to an arbitral clause contained in a
transnational contract, a demand for arbitration submitted by one party, and a
response thereto by the other party. The arbitrators may be "commercial men,"
which might include women but clearly excludes lawyers;" more commonly

8. 105 S. Ct. 3346 (1985).
9. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
10. For a convenient collection of these and other arbitration rules, see 4 J. G.
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL PROCESS 413-550 (1979). See also E. COHN, M.

WETTER, THE

EISEMANN, HANDBOOK OF INSTITUTIONAL ARBITRATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE

II. See Pando Compania Naviera S.A. v. Filmo S.A.S. [1979] Q.B. 742, at 746.

DOMKE

(1977).

& F.
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outside the maritime field and some trade associations, they are law trained,
including retired judges, practicing lawyers, and law professors. 12
Typically, the arbitrators come from different states, and the chairman (or
neutral arbitrator) comes from a third state, which may or may not be the situs of
the arbitration. The most common pattern is for each party to choose one arbitrator; thereafter either the two arbitrators so chosen choose the presiding
arbitrator or chairman, or an appointing authority such as a national council
designated by the International Chamber of Commerce designates the chairman. 13 Governments-or more likely government-owned entities such as national grain marketing boards or oil companies-may be parties, and are treated
like other litigants. At the most general level, to be developed through this
article, the law applied by the arbitrators is civil or commercial law, not public
international law. 14

I. PROCEDURE
One striking difference between Anglo-American and European conduct of
civil litigation is the difference in the role of the judge on the one hand, and the
lawyers on the other. 1SIn the American, and perhaps even more in the English
model, the judge is a kind of umpire, with no responsibility to find out for
himself what went on between the parties, no expectation that he will question the
witnesses or seek out evidence that may help to illuminate the controversy. In the
European model, in contrast, the judge (or one of a panel of three judges) is in
charge of preparing the dossier and gathering the evidence, and he or she usually
takes the lead in questioning the witnesses. 6 In the Anglo-American system,
everything points to the trial, i.e., an uninterrupted period during which (putting
exceptions aside) the judge, the lawyers, and the parties or their representatives
are expected to put full time into the case, establishing a record on the basis of
which the case-or at least the factual part of the case-will be decided. In the
European model of a civil litigation, there is normally no trial as such, though
12. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors, 105 S. Ct. at 3358 n. 18.

13. There are usually provisions in arbitral rules or in the arbitration clause about what happens
when one side does not appoint an arbitrator or the two party-appointed arbitrators cannot agree on
the third arbitrator. I want to concentrate here, however, on what happens in an arbitration that runs its
course, and not be diverted by various "what if" considerations.
14. Thus, I do not here discuss state-to-state arbitration, which is not as different from the present
topic as might be supposed, but is sufficiently different to be beyond the scope of the present article.
15. I do not here address the even more striking difference between American and other litigation
that results from the role of the jury. Since the focus here is the influence of the litigation model on the
conduct of an arbitration, it is trial before a judge without a jury that serves as the proper basis for
comparison.
16. Needless to say, there are significant variations among the different countries, some of which
are reflected in the discussion that follows. As generalizations go, however, the text seems substantially accurate.
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witnesses may be heard and evidence may be submitted (and demanded) during
the time the case remains open, and argument by counsel will be scheduled when
the fact-gathering is concluded. 17 This critical difference, not generally understood by lawyers brought up in the American or English tradition, forms an
important background, I believe, for all of the discussion that follows.' 8
A. The Record
Though the most important sets of rules concerning international commercial
arbitration (outside the maritime field) make hearings optional, 19 hearings seem
to be dispensed with only when neither party and none of the arbitrators desires a
hearing, which is quite rare. 20 Hearings held in stages, however, are commonsay the first stage for claimant's evidence and the second stage for respondent's
evidence, or the first stage with evidence by both sides on one issue, the second
stage with evidence on other issues, perhaps a third stage for a counterclaim or
argument ("pleading" in European usage) by counsel.
One interesting difference between arbitration, American style, and arbitration, European style, concerns the record of the proceedings. In an arbitration in
the United States with American counsel and arbitrators (even if one or more
parties are foreign), there is nearly always a stenographic transcript, including
both questioning of witnesses and argument of counsel. The transcript is virtually
indistinguishable from the transcript of a trial at law, except that objections to
evidence are very infrequent. American lawyers feel comfortable with transcripts
(though they are not cheap): if there are post-hearing briefs or memoranda, the
transcript can be used to refresh the arbitrators' recollections, and to reply to the
assertions of one's adversaries. Whether arbitrators themselves use the transcript

17. If this seems strange to U.S.-trained readers, it is worth pointing out that the procedure is not
so different from the practice in admiralty-perhaps the field of municipal law that is most intemational in character.
18. Of course, in detail the procedure of each civil law country is different, just as are procedure in
the United Kingdom and the United States, and, indeed, procedure in New York and New Jersey. For
a brief explanation of the historical reasons for the different development between the civil and the

common law traditions, see R.

DAVID, ENGLISH LAW AND FRENCH LAW

56-64 (1980). For conve-

nient introductions in English to the procedure of selected countries, see R. GINSBURG & A.
BRUZELIUS, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN SWEDEN 270-98 (1965); M. CAPPELETTI & J. PERILLO, CIVIL
PROCEDURE IN ITALY 173-240 (1965); P. HERZOG, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN FRANCE 280-86 (1967);
and 2 E. COHN, MANUAL OF GERMAN LAW 204-11 (2d ed. 1971).
19. E.g., RULES OF CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION OF THE ICC art. 14(l), (3) (1975) [hereinafter cited as ICC RULES]; UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules arts. 19(2), 25(l), in 31 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 17) at 35, U.N. Doc. A/31/17 [hereinafter cited as UNCITRAL Rules].
20. It is not so rare, however, for a hearing to be devoted solely to legal argument, either when the
facts are not in dispute, or when legal issues can usefully be determined first, thereafter allowing the
parties to settle their dispute in line with the legal guidelines given by the arbitrators. The discussion
in the text assumes a hearing devoted at least in part to determination of facts.
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is hard to say; my impression is that they use them far less than the care of
counsel would suggest. "Let the record show... " this or that in a fat transcript
is rarely significant, though, of course, some record of the proceedings is essential if the arbitrators are to reach a just result.
International arbitrations tend to reflect judicial procedure in the state where
the arbitration is held, particularly if the chairman comes from that state. For
example, in France, the judge ordinarily summarizes the testimony of the witnesses, typically by dictation into a recording machine, and the summary is
submitted to the witness for signature, with such corrections as he or she chooses
to make. 2 In Zurich,22 the court generally employs a Gerichtsschreiber (literally
"court writer") who is not trained in shorthand but is generally a young lawyer
starting out on a judicial career, and ordinarily it is he or she who maintains a
protocol of the proceedings. 23 The French record of hearing can be very compact-highlights or synthesis of the witnesses' testimony; in Zurich, it seems, the
report must be a detailed (though not verbatim) record of the questions and
answers; tape recorders may be used only for the arguments of counsel, not for
testimony. I was fascinated by the difference in preparation of the record in two
21. See Nouveau Code de Procddure Civile 194-195 (Dalloz 1984) (statements of parties); id. at
arts. 219-220 (statements of witnesses); see also id. at arts 1461 (records to be kept by arbitrators).
22. In Switzerland, most substantive law is federal, but procedural law varies from canton to
canton. Zurich and Geneva (and to a lesser extent Basel) are the centers for international arbitration.
If the Concordat concerning arbitration, see infra note 23, is applicable, local procedure at the seat of
the arbitration may be disregarded.
23. See Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz vom 13. Juni 1976, §§ 141-154 (Canton of Zurich, Switzerland)
(Law of Court Procedure of 1976) [hereinafter cited as GVG].
For the requirement that a record of an arbitral proceeding be kept corresponding to the procedure
before ordinary courts, see Zivilprozessordnung vom 13. Juni 1976, § 250 (Canton of Zurich,
Switzerland) (Code of Civil Procedure) [hereinafter cited as ZPO] and H. STRAULI & G. MESSNER,
KOMMENTAR ZUR ZURCHERISCHEN ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG

498-99 (2d ed. 1982).

Under article 24 of the Swiss Concordat of March 27, 1969 concerning arbitration, applicable in a
majority of Swiss cantons including Geneva and Basle but not (prior to July I, 1985) Zurich, a record
is required to be kept, but the parties or the arbitral tribunal may agree on the manner of recording the
proceedings. See T. RUEDE & R. HADENFELDT, SCHWEIZERISCHES SCHIEDSGERICHTSRECHT

244-45 (1980). But see P.JOLIDON,

COMMENTAIRE DU CONCORDAT SUISSE SUR L'ARBITRAGE

341

(1984) (casting doubt on the requirement of minutes in arbitration conducted under the Concordat
because the analogy to ordinary civil procedure is lacking).
For an interesting instance where failure to include in the protocol correspondence between the
arbitral tribunal sitting in Zurich and the Court of Arbitration of the ICC acting pursuant to its review
authority under article 21 of the ICC Rules led to annulment of an award, see Decision of June 29,
1979, Supreme Court, Zurich (Obergericht) 76 Schweizerische Juristenzeitung 301 (note F Wiget
302-03) (1980) and 78 Blitter fiir Ziircherische Rechtsprechung 34 (1980).
For a discussion of the requirements of arbitration in Zurich in relation to cantonal procedure,
written before the enactment of the new GVG and ZPO but, apart from the section references still
valid, see Wiget, Fragen der Verfahrensgestaltung vor Gelegenheitsschiedsgerichten nach
zurcherischem Zivilprozessrecht, in FESTSCHRIFT FUR MAX GULDENER 367 (M. Kummer & H.
Walder eds. 1973).
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particular cases in which I sat, and by the difference of both from the American
pattern.
In the first case, heard in Paris, the chairman, a French lawyer, dictated
summaries of testimony at regular intervals, which were transcribed from cassettes while the hearing continued; after a short recess following appearance of
the last witness, it proved possible to submit the summaries to the witnesses for
their approval, so that the first meeting of arbitrators to consider the case could be
held right then and there with the complete record-twelve typewritten pages for
two days of hearing-in hand. The president of the tribunal in this case happened
to be very good at capturing the essence of the witnesses' statements-better, no
doubt, than the witnesses themselves. For whereas the witnesses had stammered
or mumbled, occasionally contradicted and then corrected themselves, omitted
relevant facts and then come back to them under prodding from counsel or
questioning from the panel, the arbitrator produced a neat, logical, perfectly
grammatical, and even elegant statement of the position of each witness or party.
The record of a hearing prepared in this manner comes out something like a
collection of affidavits that might be prepared by an American lawyer, except that
it reflects responses to questions and the preparer of the record has no partisan
interest. If the author is skillful, if the witnesses have told the truth as they saw it,
and if no issue of credibility has arisen, the record tends to be more useful (or at
least more convenient) than an American transcript; if there is conflict of testimony or a witness changes his story under cross-examination (of which more
below), then the record created by the judge/arbitrator may be too distilled and
organized to accurately reflect what was said, and how.
American lawyers' initial reaction to this method of creating a record tends to
be one of shock, with overtones of concern about due process. I think that on
reflection this reaction may change. Clearly if the objective is to preserve exactly
what was said at the hearing, the French method here described is unsatisfactory.
If, on the other hand, the objective is to find out what really happened that was
important to the controversy-i.e., what did the parties intend, what did they
achieve, what outside causes intervened-the value of testimony, American
style, may be overrated. If an oral hearing is seen as supplementing and explaining the written evidence, as enabling the arbitrators to place faces and impressions alongside the reams of paper that characterize most commercial disputes,
and as focusing the panel members' attention on the same subject at the same
time, its essential value may well be capable of being captured by the summary,
Paris style.
In the second case, heard in Zurich, a partner in a major Swiss law firm was
chairman of the Tribunal, and one of the firm's associates filled the role of
Gerichtsschreiber. The result was a record somewhere in between the French and
American methods: a record almost as detailed and long as a transcript, yet not a
verbatim rendition of what was said. The fact that the minutes were very detailed
led to corresponding time spent by the arbitrators, counsel, and witnesses (plus
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translators) in reviewing the draft protocol. It was hard to tell how much of the
process of "correcting" the minutes really reflected misunderstanding or error on
the part of the court writer; my impression is that there was considerable effort by
the participants to improve their style, grammar, or consistency as it would be
reflected in the written protocol, an effort that surely would not have been
undertaken if the participants had been dealing with a verbatim transcript. It
seemed to me as arbitrator that the focus on the protocol diverted attention from
the controversy itself.
I found more helpful the use of a so-called "witness statement," which
(though not particularly characteristic of Swiss, or Zurich, procedure) was used
to good advantage in the Zurich case. Each principal witness was required to
distribute in advance of his appearance a prepared statement of his testimony in
narrative form, with reference where appropriate to documents already submitted
or accompanying the statement, and with indication of those parts of the statement that reflected personal recollection, and those parts that reflected study of
the files or reports from others. The witness statements became the basis of
questioning during the witnesses' appearances at the hearing. Afterwards, the
witness statements, together with the documents to which they referred, and each
arbitrator's notes as to inconsistencies in the statements or as to weaknesses
revealed during the questioning, turned out to be the effective record-reflecting
the common experience of each of the arbitrators and tying together the documents, the written arguments, and the many days of hearings. I, for one, wondered whether this would not be a useful device in our ordinary domestic
litigation-whether, in other words, both European and American lawyers would
benefit from a technique devised-or at least adapted-for a proceeding designed to bridge several systems.
B. Discovery
It is often said by Europeans that discovery is the American lawyer's favorite
indoor sport, that such discovery is in the nature of a fishing expedition, and that
American lawyers bring lawsuits first, and gather facts afterwards. American
lawyers, on the other hand, tend to believe that Europeans-in this context
including the British-just don't understand discovery at all; and moreover, that
neither do arbitrators.
My impression is different from all of these perceptions. In the first place, I
think the idea that Americans sue first, then build their case, is much exaggerated. It may be that when a person is wheeled unconscious into the emergency
operating room of a hospital and something goes wrong during the operation,
discovery in aid of litigation is necessary to learn the name of the attending
physicians and nurses; it is certainly true that in product liability litigation,
especially where design defects are alleged, plaintiffs seek access to defendants'
files to support allegations that at the outset may be rather general. In commercial
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disputes, however, I believe both sides generally know quite well what the basis
of their claim is and what defenses the other side is likely to raise. Where
discovery is useful is where one side or the other has a duty to mitigate-e.g., to
resell rejected merchandise or to buy merchandise of the kind not delivered-and
market quotations are not really available. Usually this information is forthcoming-if not freely offered, when invited or ordered to be produced by the tribunal, as it would be in a European lawsuit. I have several times been in
arbitrations in which an inference was drawn from the failure to produce a
document-either one requested by the adversary or one alleged to exist by the
non-producing party but not submitted. I have never had the feeling that if only
the arbitrators had power like those of a U.S. judge under Rule 37 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 2 4 we could get to the bottom of a case that thus far had
left us stumped.
The European custom of initiating a lawsuit by coupling assertion of facts or
rights with references to documents or expected testimony of a witness or party
seems to be the model for initiating an international arbitration. Thus, the statement of claim typically has a documents annex that reproduces not only the
contract but the principal documents to be relied on by claimant. The responseespecially if coupled with a counterclaim-typically reproduces many of the
same documents, as well as a few others that claimant chose not to introduce at
the outset. Additional documents follow in each party's first written submission-such items as invoices paid or unpaid, inspection reports, minutes of
meetings between the parties or with non-parties. By the time of the hearing,
most of the necessary documents have been exchanged and submitted to the
arbitrators. A few additional documents show up at the hearing, one side complains that they were not furnished on schedule but the objection is disregarded,
and then the other side comes up with a few more papers-rarely the "smoking
gun." All of this takes place with some instructions from the tribunal regarding
time for submissions, and translations where necessary. Occasionally a request
for documents from one party will be submitted to the other party through the
chairman of the tribunal, possibly with a covering letter indicating that the
tribunal (or the chairman) regards the request as justified-not the same as an
order to produce.
What if one party makes an assertion based on a document described but not
produced? Or if a party denies something that could be proved or disproved by a
document in its possession? Step one is for the opposing party to seek an order
for disclosure from the tribunal, or from the chairman. If the document in
question is in the hands of a party, and if it is specifically described--"minutes
24. FED. R. Civ. P. 37. If a party fails to comply with an order to make discovery, rule 37 provides
that the court may impose appropriate sanctions, including treating pertinent facts as established,
refusal to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose designated claims or defenses, dismissal of
the proceedings, entry of a default judgment, and contempt of court.
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of the meeting of November 5," or "letter to Mr. X of February 9"-an order to
produce is fairly easy to obtain, though some arbitrators don't like to issue orders
when there is no force behind them, for fear that disobedience to an order casts
doubt on the respect for the arbitral process as a whole. Those arbitrators prefer
to "invite" the party to disclose the document, or to "indicate" that the tribunal
regards the document as important and rejects the reason given for nonproduction.
What if the document sought is still not produced? In theory, the demanding
party could seek assistance of the court at the place where the arbitration is held;
in practice, I believe such a step is very rare, and would not be welcomed by the
tribunal, because resort to the court delays the proceeding and results in (and
reflects) loss of control of the proceeding by the arbitrators. Moreover, while the
court may have jurisdiction over the parties, it would inevitably be involved in the
problem of foreign discovery, a problem no court is happy to undertake. If
arbitration is a way out of jurisdictional disputes, resort to courts for discovery of
evidence located outside the forum state is a way to reintroduce jurisdictional
disputes, often in a context where the court-as a neutral forum-has no interest
in the underlying controversy.
The better remedy, and the more common one, is for the tribunal to announce
that it will presume that the document confirms the assertion of the demanding
party, or fails to confirm the assertion of the non-producing party, but that this
presumption is tentative, subject to being withdrawn if the document is produced
within a designated period.
For example, in one tri-continental arbitration in which I served as an arbitrator, the principal issue was whether some agricultural machinery sold by the
claimant to the respondent performed satisfactorily in the adverse climate in
which it was to be used. Buyer was from a developing country, and a team of
professors engaged by the U.S. Government that had surveyed the area had
prepared a report dealing, inter alia, with the performance of the machinery in
question. The report, which gave the machinery high marks, had been circulated
in draft for comment both to the manufacturer (claimant) and to the buyer
(respondent). Evidently the buyer thereafter advised the survey team that it was
engaged in a controversy about the machinery and that no further drafts of the
report should be made available to the manufacturer. In the arbitration, the
claimant introduced the favorable report in its draft form and requested that the
final report be furnished by respondent. The respondent refused, asserting governmental privilege. Rather than ruling on a difficult issue of privilege under the
law of a country whose law on that subject would probably be impossible to
ascertain, the chairman advised the parties that the tribunal would treat the
unfinished, unsigned report as if it were a final, signed report unless within a
stated period the final report was produced. When the final report was still not
forthcoming, there was no issue of sanctions, no discussion of whether respondent actually had the privilege which it claimed. The tribunal simply ac-
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cepted the draft report, and as interpreted by the tribunal's expert, it became an
important element in decision of the case.
Not every case involves so easy an inference-that the final version of a report
is the same as a draft. But the procedure illustrated is, I believe, acceptable and
can be applied in a variety of contexts, provided the members of the tribunal are
prepared to work together. If one of the arbitrators disagrees with the procedure,
or with the proposed inference, the issue becomes troublesome, because arbitrators usually prefer not to disagree in public, at least until the case is over.
One way around such difficulty is to delegate "procedural" decisions to the
chairman, but that, too, creates problems.
It is perhaps true that certain information in the hands of third parties which
might be placed before the decision maker in American litigation, but generally
not in litigation in United Kingdom or France or Switzerland, will not be furnished to international arbitrators. And there is nothing in international arbitration procedure comparable to an examination before a trial-i.e., to an
opportunity for counsel to take the deposition of his adversary's potential witnesses 25-a device that so far as I know is only used in the United States. 26 But I
am not sure whether this is a shortcoming of arbitration (domestic as well as
international) or suggests that depositions are over-used in the United States.
Again I resort to anecdote rather than statistical survey. In a recent arbitration
which was conducted under the rules of the American Arbitration Association 27
but involved an international sale, the president of the company that had manufactured the disputed merchandise had just finished his testimony in chief on
behalf of seller, describing how the product was manufactured, what training his
workers and supervisors received, and how quality control was maintained.
Counsel for the purchaser, which had rejected the merchandise, said he would
have difficulty conducting a cross-examination, because he had not had the
benefit of studying the witness' deposition. In fact, with benefit of only a few
minutes recess, he conducted a first-class, well-prepared cross-examination,
bringing out points the witness had sought to de-emphasize, and demonstrating
weakness where there was weakness in the witness' testimony. To me, the episode
demonstrated the reverse of what counsel had said: not that arbitration was
25. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 27-32; N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 3101-3117.

26. I exclude the kind of examination before trial designed to preserve the testimony of someone in
failing health or likely to be unavailable to give evidence at the time of trial. See, e.g., United
Kingdom Rules of the Supreme Court, Ord. 39, r. I. (1985).
27. Apart from the differences already noted concerning the record of the proceedings, and a quite
different fee schedule, three principal differences between AAA and, say, ICC arbitrations may be
noted. First, under AAA rules all of the arbitrators are usually appointed by the Association from a
list, so that there are rarely party-appointed arbitrators. Second, the AAA seems to make an effort to
see that the panel not be composed entirely of lawyers, while "international rules" usually result in all
law-trained arbitrators. Third, the AAA discourages detailed written awards, whereas the ICC and
other international bodies encourage or require them.
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inadequate because it did not provide for pre-hearing depositions, but that depositions were not-or at least not always-an essential part of the litigation process.
Had I been sitting downtown as a judge instead of midtown as an arbitrator, I
would have been perfectly satisfied with the information presented by the parties
through submission of documents and testimony at the hearing. If arbitration
(domestic and international) is in this respect significantly different from American-style litigation and closer to litigation in other countries, the lesson may be
for those who think about the conduct of civil litigation in the United States.
I do not, of course, suggest a return to the "sporting theory" of litigation, 28
nor is the lesson I propose necessarily relevant for litigation between parties who
do not know each other-for example in accident or product liability cases-or
for litigation in which the state of a person's mind may be critical, such as
defamation cases involving public figures. In cases arising out of. contracts,
however-a subset that includes virtually all of international arbitration but also
much of commercial litigation-arbitration is a fairly persuasive demonstration
that much of American-style discovery might be simplified or eliminated altogether, without significant sacrifice of the ultimate objective, i.e., placing an
accurate picture of the essential facts before the decision maker.29
C. Hearing the Witnesses
Perhaps the area of greatest difference between the common law and civil law
systems of civil litigation-and the area where the American and English models
are closest together-is the taking of evidence at the hearing. As already noted,
the idea of a hearing itself in an international arbitration is largely drawn from the
common law model, though it is understood that the sessions may be separated
by weeks or months-partly to accommodate the schedules of the participants
who come from distant lands, partly because the hearing is not so firmly entrenched as the climax of the proceeding as it is in a common law trial. But
assuming that first one side and then the other presents its witnesses, 30 what is the
role of the judge (arbitrator) and what is the role of counsel? English and Amei-

28. For a discussion of the sporting theory of litigation, see C.

WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL

540 (4th ed. 1983) and the sources there cited.
29. Note that this suggestion is consistent with recent reforms of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure calling for greater control of discovery by the trial judge. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16, 26(b)(1),
26(b)(8), 26(g); Notes of the Advisory Committee, 97 FR.D. 165 at 207, 217-18 (1983). Proposed
section 437 (previously section 420) of the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law would require a
court order before discovery could be demanded for evidence located in a foreign state. See
RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW (Revised) § 437(l) comment a (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985).
30. I here follow the Anglo-American terminology of calling everyone who gives evidence a
witness. In the continental tradition a distinction is often drawn between witnesses, who are supposedly disinterested, and parties, who usually may be heard but whose evidence in some states is not
taken under oath and is given different value.
COURTS
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can lawyers have been surprised to learn that in an international arbitration they
had no right, and might not even have the opportunity, to cross-examine the other
side's witnesses; in some instances the reverse has been true, with European
counsel surprised to discover that they were expected to examine their adversary's
witnesses, a function they had thought would be carried out by the arbitrators.
The general approach in Europe, as indicated earlier, is that the court does the
questioning. While it is common to delegate to the counsel who presents a
witness (including a representative of the party) the opportunity to help the
witness bring out his or her principal points, gaps or lack of clarity in the
evidence are to be brought out by the court. Opposing counsel, of course, is
entitled to be present, and to suggest questions to the tribunal, but the idea that
adverse counsel conducts the questioning while the court (or arbitral tribunal) sits
back is unfamiliar and even unacceptable.
In anticipation of the hearing in a tricontinental arbitration a few years ago, I
exchanged a series of letters with the German chairman, in which we debated the
pros and cons of cross-examination. I started out in favor of cross-examination
just because that was what I was used to, and the chairman started out against
cross-examination, also because he was used to his own system. But both being
academics for whom arbitration was a sideline, we thought it useful to think
through our positions.
The contention of the chairman that the ICC rules were based on the continental tradition was unpersuasive to me. All that the rules state-precisely because
they seek to embrace participants from different systems-is that the procedure
is to be settled by the parties or (more commonly) by the arbitrators. 3' The
chairman's contention that it was, after all, the tribunal whose questions should
be answered, not counsel's, was harder to refute, at least at a theoretical level.
The most serious objection to cross-examination, however, seemed to be of a
different order. No doubt influenced by a string of courtroom dramas in the
movies and by Perry Mason on television, my colleague seemed to have gained a
perception common in Europe, that cross-examination pits star lawyers against
unsuspecting witnesses to humiliate them and degrade the process. The chairman
understood my reply that this pattern was unlikely in a commercial case, and that
in any event the tribunal could certainly limit cross-examination if it became

31. Article 11of the ICC Rules reads as follows:
The rules governing the proceedings before the arbitration shall be those resulting from these
Rules and, where these Rules are silent, any rules which the parties (or, failing them, the
arbitrat6r) may settle, whether or not reference is thereby made to a municipal procedural law
to be applied to arbitration.
ICC RULES, supra note 19, at art. 11. This provision, enacted effective in 1975, replaces an earlier
provision which, absent agreement by the parties, called for application of the procedural law
applicable at the place where the arbitration is held. See ICC Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration
art. 16 (1955).
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oppressive; he thought, however, that controlling cross-examination would also
divert the attention of the tribunal from where it should be focused. "It seems to
me" he wrote, "that the questioning should be left to arbitrators but that the
parties or their lawyers [sic] should also have the right to put questions to
witnesses after asking the chairman of the arbitration tribunal to let them do
"
so . ..
I thought taking the lead in questioning the witnesses ourselves would put a
burden on the arbitrators that I was not accustomed to, because it would mean
learning the documentary record in advance rather than using the hearing and
accompanying briefs to guide us through the facts. Though I was willing to
undertake this greater level of preparation, I wondered whether I could simultaneously conduct a systematic questioning of a witness and reflect on the answers. To the extent the questioning was designed to clarify answers-for
instance to explain in layman's terms what might well be technical explanations
about the functioning of a machine or the working of a market-I thought the
tribunal might do almost as well as opposing counsel, especially if all three
arbitrators were prepared. What worried me was the prospect of a direct conflict
in testimony, or (even absent a direct conflict) doubt about the truthfulness of a
witness. Questioning designed to bring out contradiction in a witness' testimony,
I argued, has to be to some extent tricky-leading the witness from Point A
through Points B, C, and D and then back to A. Such questioning, it seemed to
me, is best conducted by someone who expected, hoped, or had incentive to
expose the witness; such hope or expectation or incentive is quite inconsistent
with the role of an arbitrator. It seemed to me to be particularly inappropriate for
a party-appointed arbitrator, whose impartiality is inevitably subject to some
uncertainty; and it seemed inappropriate also for the chairman, who should
always strive to conduct the proceedings from the point of view that everyone
who appears before the tribunal is truthful and is doing his best to help the
arbitrators. Thus, it seemed to me that abandoning cross-examination by counsel
would mean giving up an element in the process of establishing the facts that
would not be significant in every case but might well be critically important in
some cases.
In the particular case to which this debate was prelude, a compromise procedure was worked out whereby after counsel offering a witness made his initial
presentation, the tribunal would take over the questioning but opposing counsel
could propose questions to be pu t ,o the witness by the tribunal, with the chairman "adopting" the questions ,s his own. After a while this process became
cumbersome, and counsel was permitted to put the questions directly, subject to
disapproval (without need for objections) by the chairman. In other cases, variations on this technique have been adopted. My impression is that cross-examination-often called something else-is gradually gaining favor in international
arbitration. A consequence is that European counsel are studying the record and
preparing for the hearing more carefully then they once did, in emulation of their
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American counterparts. 32 As arbitrator, I still know I need to prepare more
thoroughly for an international arbitration with a European chairman than would
be necessary for a hearing in New York or London modeled on common law
procedure. But I feel more comfortable in evaluating what went on in a hearing
when there has been questioning by both counsel, and I believe this is taking
place more and more.
Perhaps the best combination of techniques is the requirement of a witness
statement, which has some of the aspects of pre-trial discovery, followed by a
hearing at which the witness amplifies his statement, and then cross-examination
prepared (at least partly) in advance, so that opposing counsel knows where to
focus his inquiry, rather than probing at random until he finds a weak spot. Of
course, whether the tribunal maintains the fiction that the cross-examination is
conducted under delegation from the arbitrators, or it simply presides over questioning by opposing counsel after the proponent and the arbitrators have had their
turn, there should be no doubt that the tribunal can control the proceedings, to
prevent bullying, repetition, insinuations, or other abuse of the process.
II.

CHOICE OF LAW

One might suppose that someone engaged regularly in international arbitration
would learn a great deal about conflict of laws as practiced in various states. After
all, international arbitration (except when the arbitrators are expressly invited or
required to decide ex aequo et bono) demands decision under law,33 and by
definition at least two and possibly more systems of law may be invoked to give
content to this requirement. My experience is that choice of law plays a smaller
role than might be expected from the large volume of scholarly writing on the
subject. 14 This fact, too, I believe, suggests something about the law in general-

32. The appearance of teams of counsel from Paris, Amsterdam, or Frankfurt also seems more
common, again in emulation of their colleagues from New York, Washington, or Los Angeles.
33. See, e.g., ICC Rules, supra note 19, at art. 13(3), 13(4); UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 11, at
art. 33; Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration art. 28(3), in UNCITRAL, Report of the
Working Group on International Contract Practices on the Work of its Seventh Session 6, 24, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.9/246 (1984) (derived in this respect from the arbitration law of most European states)
[hereinafter cited as UNCITRAL Model Law]. The Model Law is discussed and reproduced in
Herrmann, The UNCITRAL Model Law, I ARB. IrT'L 6 (1985).
34. For a comprehensive bibliography, see J. LEW, supra note 6, at 591-97. See also Croff, The
Applicable Law in an International Commercial Arbitration: Is It Still a Conflict ofLaws Problem?,
16 INT'L LAW. 613 (1982); J. ROBERT, supra note 4, at 278-90; Klein, The Law to be Applied by the
Arbitrators to the Substance of the Dispute, in THE ART OF ARBITRATION, supra note 2, at 189;
Lando, Conflict of Law Rules for Arbitrators, in FESTSCHRIFT FUR KONRAD ZWEIGERT 157 (H.
Bernstein, U. Drobnig & H. Kotz eds. 1981); P. Lalive, Les rdgles de conflit de lois appliquies au
fond du litige par l'arbitre international siegeant en Suisse, in L'ARBITRAGE INTERNATIONALE PRIVE

ET LA SUISSE (Memoires publids par la Facultd de Droit de Gen~ve No. 53, W. Wenger and P. Lalive,
eds. 1976). Each of these works also contains a bibliography.
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substantial similarity in result reached by legal systems with quite different
points of departure, and convergence in the international arena that seems to be
helped along by the process of transnational decision-making.
In roughly half the arbitrations in which I have been involved, there was an
express choice of law clause, and that choice was always honored. 35 More often
than not, the law chosen was that of the principal place of business of one of the
parties, while the arbitration was at a neutral situs. Particularly in contracts with
enterprises from developing countries, the attitude of Western contractors seems
to have been, "You can choose the law, if we can choose the forum and means of
dispute settlement."
What if no governing law is designated in the contract? Several alternatives are
36
suggested in the literature.
(i) The arbitrators should apply the law applicable at the place where the
arbitrations is held-i.e., the maxim (popular especially in England) "qui
elegit judicem elegit ius" should be applied to arbitration agreements
specifying a situs for the arbitration as it would be to choice of a judicial
forum. 37
I have never formally encountered this proposition in an arbitration, possibly
because I have never sat in London. The disposition to "do things our way," of
course, persists whenever arbitrators, and particularly the chairman, sit in their
own home base, though less, I think, on matters of substance than on the
procedural issues discussed in the previous sections of this article. In my view,
this alternative has little to recommend it. If the parties had wanted to say "the
law applicable at the situs of the arbitration governs the contract," they could
easily have done so, and the omission of such a provision suggests rather the
reverse: the parties were able to agree on arbitration to settle future controversies
and then added a situs, but either they did not think about or they could not agree
on a governing law. The choice of Geneva or Paris or London or New York as the

35. Such a clause would not, I expect, be honored if the law was chosen to evade a mandatory
provision of national law, for example an export control applicable in the place from which goods
were to be exported. For an instance of such a case, arising out of an arbitration, see Regazzoni v.
K.C. Sethia (1944) Ltd., [19581 A.C. 301.
36. Not all the possible alternatives are discussed here, and the formulations adopted by the writers
cited in note 34 differ. The article by Lando contains the draft of "Recommendations on the Law
Applicable to International Contracts" to be submitted to the International Chamber of Commerce.
Lando, supra note 34. So far as I am aware, no action has been taken on these recommendations.
37. For a decision of the House of Lords discussing the maxim "he who chooses the forum,
chooses the law," and stating that it is too rigid to be uniformly applied, see Compagnie d'Armement
Maritime S.A. v. Compagnie Tltnisienne de Navigation S.A., 119711 A.C. 572, reversing [1969] I
W.L.R. 1338 (C.A.). While this case arose out of an arbitration, it seems that the toning down of the
maxim from a rigid rule to a rebuttable presumption applies to the choice of judicial forum as well as
to choice of a situs for arbitrations.
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situs of an arbitration is more likely to be related to travel schedules or the
perception of traditional neutrality, such as in Geneva, than to any study of the
law of commercial transactions applicable at the situs chosen.
(ii) The arbitratorsshould apply the choice of law rules applicable at the
place where the arbitrationis held."
This alternative, analogous in the international arena to the rule of Klaxon v.
Stentor for federal courts in the United States, 3 9 seems to me no more persuasive
than alternative (i). Surely parties to a contract do not consciously choose any
state's conflict of laws rules, whether directly or by implication. But I have never
as arbitrator had to insist on the point, because in cases that I have participated in,
alternative (ii) tended to point to the same source of law as alternative (iii), which
leaves the choice of law to the arbitrators. 40 For example, if seller in an international sales contract fails to deliver and claimsforce majeure, it would seem that
that term should be defined at the place where seller asserts it was prevented from
performing; if there is a dispute about a warranty, the law applicable at the place
where the merchandise is to be used should govern. Whether this result is reached
directly, or indirectly by following the choice of law rules of the situs of the
arbitration, probably does not matter, so long as antiquated rules looking to the
41
place of contracting do not prevail at the situs.

38. The Compagnie Tunisienne case, [1971] A.C. 572, seems to be an illustration of this alternative, in that, once the inference of the law of the situs is held to be rebuttable, English conflict of
laws doctrine determines the law to be applied by the arbitrators. Among the important advocates of
this alternative was M.G. Sauser-Hall, who recited it as chairman of the famous Aramco arbitration,
Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco), 27 I.L.R. 117, 156 (1958) (Sauser-Hall
Arb.) and developed it, inter alia, in Sauser-Hall, L'Arbitrage en droit international priv4, [1952] 1
ANNUAIRE DE LINSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 394. Resort to the choice of law rules of the
situs of the arbitration is reflected in a proposed rule of the 1957 Session of the Institut de Droit
International, for which Sauser-Hall was Rapporteur. Resolution Concerning Arbitration in Private
International Law art. I1, as adopted by the Institute of International Law at its Session at Amsterdam,
Sept. 18-27, 1957, (1957] 2 ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 491, 496. The
UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 33, expressly rejects this approach in article 28(l).
39. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941) (in actions brought in federal
courts under the diversity jurisdiction, the choice of law rules of the state where action is brought, not
independent federal conflict of laws rules, must be applied).
40. If my experience on this point is typical, it suggests that choice of law with respect to
commercial contracts is not as disorganized as either the revolutionary or the counter-revolutionary
scholars of conflict of laws would have us believe. The literature on this subject is of course vast, and
well beyond the scope of this essay. For a convenient start, see The Influence of Modern American
Conflicts Theories on European Law, 30 AM. J. COMP. L. 1-146 (1982).
41. A modified version of this alternative, which I also know only from the literature and not from
experience, would say that if, according to the law of the place of the arbitration the parties could not
choose the law they in fact chose in their contract, then the arbitrators may not give effect to the
parties' choice of law. See, e.g., Klein. supra note 34, at 193-94 and the sources there cited.
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(iii) The arbitratorsshould make their own choice of law, independently of
the law of the place where they sit.
If the choice is obvious, or if the arbitrators feel confident on the subject of
conflict of laws, this is a convenient alternative, because it cuts out a step in
research and argument, and enables counsel and the tribunal to consider the
underlying case early in the arbitration. 42 If, as is usually the case, the consequence of the choice of a particular state's law is not immediately apparent, a
good technique is for the arbitrators to invite the parties early on-for instance at
the meeting to settle the terms of reference called for by the ICC Rules 4 3-to

agree that the laws of state X will be applied to the dispute. If neither side objects
strenuously, the choice between (ii) and (iii) may not have to be specified: the
arbitration will be conducted as if the parties had agreed on the applicable law in
their original contract. Some counsel are nervous about such an invitation, and
are reluctant to give their formal agreement to a question they have not carefully
researched; if the arbitrators announce their tentative inclination to apply the law
of X, however, that is usually all that is necessary. I have never been in an
arbitration in which the parties devoted major resources to argument about choice
of the applicable law. More common, in my experience, is an argument really
directed to alternative (iv): "We believe the law of A is applicable, and under that
law our client is entitled to prevail. But even if the law of B were applied, the
result would be the same." 44
(iv) The arbitratorsshould postpone the question of choice of law until it is
needed.41

If for instance, the law of either the buyer's or the seller's principal place of
business applies (or, say, either the law of the shipowner or that of the charterer),
42. Article 13 of the ICC Rules provides:
(3) The parties shall be free to determine the law to be applied by the arbitrator to the merits
of the dispute. In the absence of any indication by the parties as to the applicable law, the
arbitrators shall apply the law designated as the proper law by the rule of conflict of laws
which he deems proper.
(5) In all cases the arbitrator shall take account of the provisions of the contract and the
relevant trade usages.
ICC RULES, supra note 19, at art. 13(3), 13(5). To similar effect, see UNCITRAL Rules, supra note
19, at art. 33.
43. See ICC RULES, supra note 19, at art. 13. It is not obligatory under this article to have a
meeting, and in cases in which the amount in dispute is not large the terms of reference are often
negotiated by telephone and telex.
44. A variation on this alternative, advocated by the former Secretary General of the ICC Court of
Arbitration, is to look at all the choice of law systems that have any connection with the parties or the
transaction: if they all point to the same choice of law, for example, to the law of the seller's domicile
or of the flag of the ship, that law is applied. See Derains, L'Application cumulative par larbitre des
systemes de conflit de lois intmressis au litige, 1972 REVUE DE L'ARBITRAGE 99, 103.
45. For a criticism of this alternative as a "no-rule approach," see Lando, supra note 34, at 166.
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the tribunal will wait and see if there is a legal issue at all in the case, then see if
the relevant law of state A or B is different, and only if both of these conditions
obtain, make a decision on the applicable law. Of course, if the choice is
postponed until it has been determined to be critical, the decision should probably be made only following submissions (oral or written) on behalf of the parties.
These submissions, in turn, may incorporate, in effect, alternatives (i), (ii), or
(iii).
A substantial school of thought regards alternative (iv) as theoretically unsound, because it implies that arbitrators can function without an anchor to law. 46
American lawyers, on the one hand less concerned about theory, and on the other
hand trained through study of constitutional law in the Supreme Court to
postpone issues until their decision cannot be avoided, seem to be less bothered
by this approach than their European counterparts. My own experience suggests
that the difference in the substantive law of most states with regard to such issues
as when a contract is formed, what are the duties of buyer and seller, owner and
contractor, and similar staples of contract disputes are slight, even when the
sources of law and the formulations of the rules differ considerably. Leaving
aside matters of family law, inheritance, and administrative law, which virtually
never figure in the type of arbitration under discussion, the major differences
seem to concern such questions as force majeure and (for states influenced by
Islamic law) the availability of interest and substitutes therefor. This (over)statement is not to be taken as a condensed milk version of comparative law; it
suggests only that alternative (iv) has a good deal to be said in its favor. 47
Sometimes alternative (iv) runs into alternative (v), in that the award may simply
say "The tribunal interprets the intention of the parties as containing the following obligations. . . . In our view, Respondent failed to carry out the third obligation and claimant was damaged to the extent of $X. . . ," without ever stating

the law under which that conclusion was reached. Perhaps the better form would
be to add a statement that this conclusion may be supported by the law of state A
as well as by the law of state B; the point, however, is that the choice of law was
not in fact critical to the progress of the arbitration, or to the award.
For a more favorable view based essentially on the American concept of "false conflict," see Croff,
supra note 34, at 632.
46. See, e.g., Mann, Lex Facit Arbitrum, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: LIBER AMICORUM
FOR MARTIN DOMKE 157, 160 (P. Sanders ed. 1967):
[No one has ever or anywhere been able to point to any provision or legal principle which
would permit individuals to act outside the confines of a system of municipal law; even the
idea of the autonomy of the parties exists only by virtue of a given system of municipal law
and in different systems may have different characteristics and effects].
Id.
47. To the extent this point is persuasive, it also suggests that, contrary to some writers, choosing
the applicable law in a contract may not be the most important thing, and that the position of "you can
choose the law if we can choose the forum" mentioned above, is a sound bargain.

182

BUSINESS LAW

(v) The arbitratorsshould apply lex mercatoria.
Finally, some arbitrators and scholars contend that there is a law of international trade not linked to any particular state-a so-called law merchant or lex
mercatoria.Professor Goldman of Paris, himself an experienced arbitrator and an
authority on both international law and commercial law, has been the leading
exponent of this approach in print. 48 1 do not want here to engage in the debate,
which has already engendered considerable writing in legal journals, particularly
in Europe ,' 49 about the legitimacy of arbitrators applying a law that no relevant
legislature has enacted and no authoritative court has announced.5 0 1 think in fact
many arbitral decisions make use of this approach, often without fully articulating it, and without an express discussion about whether an international law
merchant really exists.
Does such a body of law-that is, a system of obligation, and remedy going
beyond custom-exist? On such issues as seller's duty to comply with specifications and buyer's duty to pay for accepted goods and to give prompt notice of
rejection, the law of practically all states is the same; thus the difference between
alternative (iv) and (v) is likely to be negligible, and the result would probably be
the same under any of the other alternatives as well. Where resort to an international law of commerce and contract-openly or sub silentio-may make a
difference is in such subjects as the consequence of unforeseen events, the duty
of dealing in good faith, and the obligation to mitigate damages. Of course these
are not subjects unknown in national laws, but I think they are subject to a special
understanding in the context of international transactions-understanding by
merchants and by those called upon to decide controversies between them.
Perhaps the best example is the law relating to force majeure. Suppose buyer
and seller contract for a sale of merchandise from India to Italy, seller contends
he is unable to perform within the stated price and time, because the Suez Canal
is once again closed as a result of a Middle East crisis. National law might either
discharge the seller completely, or hold him fully liable. 5' A jurisprudence of
commercial reality would probably conclude that each side assumed a portion of
the risk that the Canal might not remain open, that it would be unfair to place the
loss solely on either party, and that the loss should be shared in some proportion,
depending on the circumstances.

48. See, e.g., Goldman, Les Conflits de lois dans I'arbitrage international de droit prive, 109
RECUEIL DES COURS 347, 542 (Hague Acad. Int'l Law 1963).
49. For a convenient discussion of the literature, see Klein, supra note 34.
50. This discussion assumes-as has been my unbroken experience-that the arbitrators have not
been asked to function as amiable compositeurs, or to decide ex aequo et bono.
51. For an example of the latter, see the decision of the British House of Lords in Tsakiroglou &
Co. Ltd. v. Noblee Thorl G.m.b.H., (1962] A.C. 93. For criticism of this and similar decisions, see
Schlegel, Of Nuts, and Ships, and Sealing Wax, Suez, and Frustrating Things-The Doctrine of
Impossibility of Performance, 23 RUTGERS L. REV. 419 (1969).
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To take a similar illustration, suppose in an arbitration arising out of an international sales contract seller in state X demonstrates that he was unable to furnish
the goods in question in the time prescribed because of a dock strike in X which
lasted 37 days. The contract either contained no provision concerning force
majeure, or continued a very general "subject to force majeure" clause.52 Should
the arbitrators look to see whether case law in State X would regard the contract
at an end without liability? Depending on the character and intended use of the
goods, and perhaps some facts about prior dealings of the parties or the industry,
I would think the arbitrators should, and generally would, feel themselves free to
award that the required performance was postponed for the length of the strike
(and perhaps a few additional days), but that thereafter seller was obligated to
ship, and buyer was obligated to take. In other words, lex mercatoria, corresponding to the expectations of the parties, provides that the obligations arising
from the contract are suspended, not canceled.
I do not think it is necessary to set up a law of international commercial
transactions against the law of particular states, which typically does not make
special provisions for international, as contrasted with internal, transactions. For
example, in an international arbitration in which I sat, which I will call Buyer v.
Seller, Seller failed to complete an international shipment to Buyer. Seller
claimed force majeure, but was unable to establish it to the satisfaction of the
arbitrators. Buyer, however, was a middleman, who had a contract to resell to his
customer in a third country. When it appeared likely that the shipment would not
go forward, the customer offered to settle with Buyer for $1.50 per unit; had
Buyer paid that sum to Customer and then reclaimed that amount in the arbitration against Seller, the arbitrators would surely have awarded him full recovery. It
turned out, however, that Buyer had "passed on" the settlement offer by proposing a settlement to Seller for $3.50 per unit, without disclosing Customer's offer.
This seemed unfair to the arbitrators-a departure from the good faith required
of merchants, and therefore to call for a reduction in the damages to be awarded
to Buyer.
Of course, it would have been possible in this, as in other cases, to point to a
provision in the civil or commercial code of the state whose law was applicable
calling for obligations to be carried out in good faith; but the elements of good
faith or fair dealing, as seen by the arbitrators, came not from the internal law of a
given state, but from perceptions of the arbitrators about how merchants in
international transactions generally do behave and expect each other to behave.
Thus, I see alternative (v) only partly as a liberation from or alternative to the

52. For a sample of this and similar clauses, as well as more elaborate clauses and contracts with
no provisions at all on the subject, see A. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE TRADE 84-89,
DS7-75 (2d ed. 1981).
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other four alternatives: I see the denomination of lex mercatoria as an attempt,
only partly successful, to give doctrinal support to what arbitrators actually do.53
III. CONCLUSION

Is arbitration of international commercial controversies then, in the end, truly
alternative dispute settlement, and not merely a substitute for litigation in national courts? I think the answer is yes: an international arbitration is not a mirror
image of any given court or source of law, but a series of imperfect reflections
and adaptations. Viewed as a process, arbitration works (usually), because the
different national procedures, if not quite "plug compatible," as the computer
people say, turn out on the whole to be adaptable. Viewed as a search for
substantive legal solutions, it turns out that the traditions of the different legal
systems have quite a lot in common. Thus, the participants-arbitrators and
counsel-come to understand each other in the course of an arbitration even if
they did not at the outset.
This generalization should not be exaggerated. It does not apply to fields that
are on one side too personal and private, such as inheritance, support and custody, and on the other side too public and too affected with national interest, such
as competition law, securities regulation, or export control. In the vast middle
arena in which international commercial arbitration typically operates, I think the
legal solutions tend to converge, whether the starting point is West European,
East European, Anglo-American, or Islamic. 5 4 The convergence does not, of
course, lead to complete congruence, but it does, in my experience, lead to an
area of similarity, a spectrum not as wide as might have been supposed, within
which international commercial transactions are carried on and controversies are
resolved.
If this conclusion is, in general, sound, it seems to me that international
arbitration offers an additional benefit, that may not interest counsel focusing on
an individual dispute, but should interest arbitrators, observers of the process,
and indeed counsel who are involved in international transactions on a recurring
basis. Where the "international solution"--the lex mercatoria, if you will-is

53. For a fascinating episode involving litigation up to the supreme courts in two countries because
the arbitrators candidly said they were applying lex mercatoria and not any national law in requiring
good faith dealings between a principal and an agent, see Pabalk Ticaret v. Norsolor, summarized in
24 I.L.M. 360 (1985). Though the length and costliness of the dispute suggest that the candor of the
arbitrators may not have been wise, it was ultimately held by the Supreme Court of Austria (the seat of
the arbitration) that application of lex mercatoria did not justify setting the award aside, and by the
French Cour de Cassation that it did not render the award unenforceable under the New York
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.
54. I assume the same could be said with respect to other systems-for instance those from the Far
East-but I have not had any experience with them.
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significantly different from the solution of one's own country's law, international
arbitration provides the other side of the mirror: Once it appears that the solution
in one's own country is not inevitable, it does not require a great leap to question
whether that solution is even the right one. Thus international arbitration, like
conflict of laws, not only broadens the horizon, but may well contribute to
enlightened introspection-of process, and of substance.

